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The transaction costs perspective on standards as a source of trade and 
productivity growth 
 
Frank A.G. den Butter, Stefan P.T. Groot and Faroek Lazrak 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the design, implementation and use of standards from the perspective of 
transaction costs economics. A proper design and implementation of standards may lead to a 
considerable reduction of transaction costs, which enhances trade and, consequently, 
economic welfare. A major example is the use of containers, which has drastically changed 
the worldwide transport infrastructure, and lowered the costs of transport of goods 
considerably. The example of containers also shows that network externalities play a major 
role in the use of standards, and that, on the other hand, worldwide standards with large sunk 
investment costs may lead to a lock-in. This may call for government intervention in the 
design and use of standards, and in the transition processes to new standards. The paper 
provides ample further examples of standards and on the role of the government, or clubs, 
with respect to these standards.  
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The transaction costs perspective on standards as a source of trade and 
productivity growth 
 
Frank A.G. den Butter, Stefan P.T. Groot and Faroek Lazrak.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2006 the container celebrated its fiftieth birthday (see Box 1). The container is an excellent 
example of what we want to illustrate in this paper, namely that standards, especially when 
they are used world wide, can bring about a substantial reduction of transaction costs. In this 
way standards promote international trade and enhance productivity and welfare. Because of 
the effects on productivity, the use of standards like the container can be considered an 
important innovation. It is not so much a “high tech'” innovation, but it is rather the common 
acceptance of the standard and its surrounding infrastructure, that are essential for the 
productivity gains of such standards. Standards that reduce transaction costs fit well in the 
tradition of trading nations such as the Netherlands. In this country, as early as in the 17th 
century – the “Golden Age” - setting standards contributed to the high level of welfare. 
Rembrandt’s famous painting of the syndics - “De Staalmeesters” - is a testimony of this 
(picture 1). The syndics controlled and categorized the quality of “laken”, a fine woolen 
fabricate, so that it was unnecessary for traders to control for quality every time before a 
transaction could be made. This reduced transaction costs. Another example is the 
internationally accepted sea law of the Dutch lawyer Hugo de Groot (picture 2). 
Harmonization of the various existing rules has made trade over sea safer, and therefore 
reduced transaction costs. 
 
Since then world trade flows have continued to grow, though with ups and downs, to their 
current scale. This growth, which resulted in a huge increase of GDP par capita in the 
industrialized world, accelerated in the past 50 years. The widespread use of containers 
resulted in a considerable reduction of transportation costs, among others through reduced 
costs of loading and unloading ships, trains and trucks. At the same time, formal trade 
barriers, such as import restrictions and tariffs, have been gradually removed to some extent. 
It implies that informal trade barriers, like differences in tax legislation, administrative and 
legal requirements, became an increasingly important part of transaction costs. The further 
development of standards can contribute to a further reduction of informal trade barriers, and 
hence to a reduction of the transaction costs that are a result of these barriers. In this way 
standardization can contribute to a further increase in trade and prosperity. It is also in line 
with the trend of increasing specialization and fragmentation of production processes 
throughout the world. Low transaction costs promote that different parts of the production 
chain are produced at locations where a comparative cost advantage exists. This outsourcing 
of parts of the production chain enforces the process of globalization and is facilitated by a 
further reduction of trade barriers. So at the micro level of single transactions, the costs 
associated with such a transaction are reduced. However, at the same time at the macro level, 
                                                 
1
 Den Butter is professor of economics at Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Groot and Lazrak are graduates from 
that university. This article is partly based on a master class on standards organized by the Amsterdam Trade 
University (AmTU). We want to express our appreciation towards KPMG, KIT, IBFD, MSD and ITAIDE, for 
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the role of transaction costs gains importance, because globalization through fragmentation of 
production will result in an ever increasing number of transactions. Data on the relative 
increase in trade flows confirm that the increase in world wide transactions is proportionally 
larger than the decrease in costs associated with each transaction. So the proportion of value 
creation through transactions as part of total value creation increases. It implies that 
transaction management and orchestrating of the value chain becomes more and more 
important. It is for that reason that innovation policy should focus more on innovations, such 
as standardization, that support international trade. For example good ICT facilities are 
needed to enable effective assessment of security aspects, a new trend in international trade. 
The increased demand for safety, as a consequence of international terrorism, functions as a 
new trade barrier. Standards can help to increase the safety of transport while at the same time 
reducing the costs of the safety measures that are needed.  
 
Box 1:  The container 
 
In April 1956 a harbor crane in the American city Newark loaded 58 aluminum containers in an old tanker. 
Five days later, the tanker was unloaded in Houston, where the containers were placed on 58 trucks, that 
would transport the containers to their final destinations. Since that moment, the container has conquered 
the world. Specialized ships can transport up to 13'000 containers at a time. This number is still rising 
gradually. Cranes in special build container ports can move 30 to 40 containers per hour, and sometimes 
process 10'000 containers a day. One container ship can be unloaded and loaded again in 24 hours (see 
Levinson, 2006). Thanks to the standard sizes that containers have, containers will fit on all appropriate 
ships and vessels, trains and trucks at any location on the world. A container is nothing more than an empty 
box of steel or aluminum, with a wooden floor and a large door at one side, about 7 feet wide and high, and 
slightly over 20 or 40 feet long. Clearly no big technological breakthrough. Still, the container managed to 
enable an enormous productivity gain in trade and transport. It has resulted in a global revolution in the way 
goods are shipped and transported. Without the container, globalization on a scale as we have seen during 
the last decades would have been very unlikely to occur. The whole infrastructure for the transport of goods 
is nowadays adapted to containers. In New York, the Chelsea Peers, that were reserved for the traditional 
loading and unloading of freighters, have been transformed to an entertainment center. Without the 
container, it would probably still have its old function. Alike, in Rotterdam parts of the old harbor area have 
new functions nowadays: the “Kop van Zuid” and the “Loydskwartier” have become residential areas, and 
are no longer used for loading and unloading general cargo. 
 
This paper discusses the relationship between standards and transaction costs, and its 
importance for the strategic decisions both in the private and in the public sector. The next 
section gives a taxonomy of standards illustrated by some examples. Section 3 discusses the 
reduction of transaction costs that standardization and more specifically the chosen examples 
can bring about. An important question is how the welfare gains that are a result of decreased 
transaction costs are shared between the different stakeholders. This is the subject of section 4 
which discusses how in a setting of different stakeholders, unifying standards are designed 
and implemented. Here, an important question is what economic incentives play a role in such 
processes. Some standards obtain the character of a public good, as the usage of standards 
cannot be restricted to those who contributed to its development and implementation, or 
because it is not in the public interest to restrict the usage of the standard. On the other hand, 
an existing standard can lead to an unwarranted monopoly situation due to economies of scale 
and network externalities inherent to the use of standards. Against this background, section 5 
reviews the role that the government can play in this context. Section 6 summarizes the main 
findings of this study, and concludes.  
 
2. Types of standards: a classification 
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Figure 1 summarizes how various types of standards and their role in the economy can be 
classified. The following definition encompasses more or less these roles in the economy: “a 
standard is the specification of the characteristics of goods and services that provides 
information on the quality of these goods and services and/or enhances their interoperability”. 
This section elaborates the classification of figure 1 based on the characteristics of the various 
types of standards. This classification necessarily is somewhat fuzzy as the characteristics 
may differ in different circumstances, which makes a clear separation of roles impossible. 
 
Figure 1:  Classification of standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification of standards: an overview 
The first distinction made in figure 1 is between public and private standards. This 
classification refers to the way standards originate. Is the market responsible for their 
development, or was it a government initiative? The government has the ability to make the 
standards mandatory through the introduction of legislation. This is in contrast to voluntary 
standards.  
 
The following distinction of figure 1 is that between standards that are related to products and 
those related to production processes. Product standards are requirements with respect to 
some characteristics of the product itself, process standards are standards that prescribe how 
certain steps in the production process should take place. A problem is that often the question 
whether a product meets a standard can only be answered by an inspection of the production 
process. This can be very costly or even impossible for products that are not produced 
domestically.  
 
The third categorization of figure 1 is based on the difference between internal and external 
standards. Internal standards are subject to the control of companies that set them, external 
standards are to be considered as given for individual companies. The remainder of this 
section provides a more detailed analysis of the classification in figure 1. 
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The extent of (product) differentiation is of importance for standards that prescribe the quality 
and specification of products and services. Economic theory distinguishes two main types of 
differentiation: vertical and horizontal differentiation. Vertical product differentiation has an 
ordinal character. To give an example: Rembrandt’s syndics controlled the quality of the 
“laken” based on a list of characteristics, where a higher quality was assigned to products with 
superior characteristics. Horizontal product differentiation has no ordinal ordering, and is 
solely based on the individual taste of consumers. Therefore standards may have influence on 
the extent of product differentiation, where a more stringent standardization leads to reduced 
possibilities of product variation for the consumer.  
 
A private standard is a standard which primarily focuses on the interests of the private 
stakeholders that develop the standards. These stakeholders will only take the interests of 
consumers into account to the extent that it benefits their own interests. 
  
Private standards can develop in different ways. For example, an individual firm may decide 
to share certain characteristics with other firms. The private standard can also originally be an 
internal standard (see later) that is adopted later on by other players in the market. An example 
is the bar code in the Netherlands. It was Albert Heijn, the Dutch branch of the multinational 
grocery company Ahold, that started to use this within its own supermarkets and logistics, and 
forced all its suppliers and business connections to make use of their standardized barcode 
system. 
 
Alternatively, a group of firms can decide to develop a standard together. Firms often have 
shared interests, when they belong to the same industry and/or have the same suppliers and 
customers. When the standard can be used freely by third parties, it is called an “open 
standard”. It is important to note that (in contrast to popular belief) is not the fact that the 
standard has no particular owner that makes it to an open standard, but merely that it can be 
used freely. There may be confusion with “open source”, where the standard cannot only be 
used freely, but where it can also be changed to the desires of individual users. An open source 
standard is, because of this flexibility, less “standard”, which results in a better 
correspondence with the specific demands of customers and allows for a larger product 
differentiation. 
 
In other occasions, that is when a standard is owned by a collective of private organizations, 
one can speak of a club good (see also box 2). Here, the use of the standard is non-rival, but 
others (non members) can be excluded from using the standard. In that case, the standard does 
not have the full character of a collective good (which should be non rival and non 
excludable). A good example of such a club good is SWIFT. SWIFT is a collective of 
financial institutions that develops products for its members that deal with financial 
communication. In order to enable the communication and interactions in a safe and trustful 
manner, SWIFT has developed several standards in use for such communication. Franchising 
is another interesting example of a standard as club good. Through franchising existing 
product formulas and networks can be used (which results. for example, in economies of scale 
in purchases, logistics, and marketing), so that costs can be reduced. At the same time, the 
consumers information costs are being substantially reduced (a hamburger of McDonald's in 
Moscow  is the same as in Amsterdam, so that the customer knows what he is up to), which 
results in a competitive advantage and therefore makes it very profitable for entrepreneurs to 
join such a formula. 
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There are also other economic incentives and interests that can stimulate actors to develop a 
standard together. For example, consumer interest organizations can develop a standard to 
compare the quality of different kind’s products and services. Something similar holds for a 
trade union that tries to get good working conditions or safety standards introduced for their 
members. A lot of standards related to the ICT sector and the coordination between software 
and hardware have their roots in the private domain. 
 
Box 2: XBRL 
 
A recent example of a standard that has been developed as a club good is the eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL). XBRL is a standard which registers corporate records – e.g. all kinds of 
bookkeeping and financial data - in a unified manner, and which presents them to different stakeholders. 
XBRL is comparable with the example of the container from box 1. XBRL transports financial information 
in the same way as the container transports goods in a standardized way. The standard enables different 
stakeholders to make digital financial and non financial data from their back office compatible for external 
usage. The external stakeholder can subsequently use the data in their own system, and extract the 
information according to the specification that they need. It is like a computer language, where the syntax 
has been standardized, while at the same time providing every user with he possibility to give an own 
interpretation to the semantics and use it in a way that suits their interests best (Dreyer and Wallis, 2006). 
Tax statements are also made less complex, since collecting financial data has become more 
straightforward. It thus improves the effectiveness and efficiency of collecting data, increases access to the 
information, and thereby results in a substantial reduction of costs for both the sender and the recipient of 
the information. There is no longer a need to make independent data collections for different usages. The 
receiver also knows for certain that the data has been calculated and reported using the appropriate 
definitions. The use of XBRL as standard has been promoted by a consortium of private actors (with at this 
time over 400 members).  In the Netherlands the government (tax authorities, Central Bureau of Statistics,) 
has, in quite an early stage, supported the initiative to get XBRL more widespread and implemented as a 
standard for corporate financial statements (see also XBRL Nederland, 2006; Het Nederlands 
Taxonomieproject, 2006). XBRL is a good example of a standard that originated in the market, while the 
government joined the initiative later on. This path is regularly followed in the development of standards 
(this is also often the case when a new drug is introduced), and it enables a good balance of private and 
public interests. 
 
Public standards are standards imposed by the government. Public standards attempt to serve 
a public interest. Most public standards have a large and rather general scope. The design and 
implementation of these standards becomes complex so as to meet all interests the different 
stakeholders, which is even more difficult when some interests are opposite. Public standards 
therefore require a political choice where the interests of different stakeholders are being 
weighted against each other. As yet, public standards are often a follow up to earlier private 
standards, which have been adapted by the government to become public standards in order to 
bring them more and more in line with public interests (WTO, 2005, p.33). In this respect the 
government may define the general conditions to which private standards have to comply. 
Public standards may also take private standards as model for defining specific characteristics. 
 
Voluntary or mandatory standards 
Public standards can be both voluntary and mandatory. A private standard is always a 
voluntary standard, unless government made that standard a public standard. Yet the threat of 
the government to make a standard a mandatory one can sometimes be a reason for private 
parties to introduce their own standard that is somewhat in line with government demands 
while still serving their own interests better than in case of a mandatory public standard. 
Examples are various codes of conduct - rules of appropriate behavior for companies and their 
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employees – that are the result of both ethical considerations and pressure of the government 
and other interest groups (e.g. NGO’s). For instance, Shell has introduced high ethical and 
ecological standards partially in reaction to pressure from governments, human right 
organizations and environmental protest groups. Several types of self regulation are based on 
similar “voluntary” standards. The trigger mechanism behind it is that the costs of a reputation 
loss when the requirements of the standard have not been met can be very high. 
 
Process and product standards 
There are a number of rationales for process standards: (i) they may have a direct influence on 
the product quality (for example hygienic standards), or quality of services (for example ISO-
certification); (ii) they enhance production efficiency (for example in case of network 
externalities), or (iii) they internalize external effects (as with environmental standards) 
(WTO, 2005, p.35). Moreover ethical considerations can play a role in the restrictions set by a 
process standards, for example in the case of child labor. 
 
Product standards specify the characteristics of the product. A technical specification enables 
different companies to make use of the same product as input, as these companies can adapt 
their own production processes and products to the specification of such standardized 
products. Because the container has standard sizes, or, in this perspective: its own technical 
specification, it is possible for other companies to develop their applications on the 
technological specification of the container. The example of the container shows how a 
technical specification can have a worldwide impact. This holds for all kinds of standards that 
prescribe universal sizes.  
 
According to Thompson (1954) industrial historians have somewhat undervalued the 
importance of technological standards in the automotive industry. The automotive industry is 
an early example of the use of industry wide technological specifications. These standards 
where needed because car producers had to rely on suppliers, a reliance that was relatively 
strong as a consequence of the complex nature of automobiles. An early example of a standard 
adopted by the automobile industry is the design of screws. These technological specifications 
made large scale production possible so that economies of scale were exploited.  
 
Internal and external standards 
Internal and external standards relate to different types of transaction costs (see box 3). 
Internal standards are used in order to come to a better coordination and hence to less 
transaction costs with respect to activities within the firm. External standards play a role in 
market transactions. These different roles of internal and external standards are linked to the 
way Coase (1937) described the nature of the firm. According to the Coasean principle, a firm 
has its optimal size when marginal transaction costs that are a result of (vertical) coordination 
via the hierarchy are equal to marginal transaction costs that are a result of (horizontal) 
coordination via the market. Better internal standards enable a firm to become larger, whereas 
a relative improvement of external standards enhance the possibilities to make use of 
outsourcing, subcontracting or purchase through markets. That may reduce firm size. 
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Box 3: MSD 
 
The Dutch plant of the multinational drugs company Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (MSD) provides an example 
of how internal and external standards can affect corporate management. MSD Netherlands delivers drugs 
of the mother company to customers and regions all over the world. The Dutch plant coordinates the 
logistics, packs the drugs, and makes sure that all rules and legislative requirements have been met. Within 
MSD there used to exist an enormous diversity in packages. For example, different logos were used for the 
same product. A substantial part of this diversity was unnecessary. This unnecessary diversity can be 
considered an example of a suboptimal internal standard. As the company is, to some extent, free to make 
decisions on the shape, size and design of the package, it can reduces transaction costs by setting unified 
standards for its packaging. So the Dutch plant obtained cost reductions through more internal 
standardization and unification. 
 
An external standard is ruled by mandatory requirements that have been imposed by third parties. This can 
be the government that made rules (in this case with respect to packaging of drugs), but it can also be a 
contract partner that has specifications according to the standard defined in the contract. Such external 
standards in package design play a major role in the case of MSD. MSD has to deal with many different 
prescriptions in various countries with respect to packaging and distribution of drugs. These differences  
relate to texts and codified signs on the package, to bar codes, and to medical descriptions and warnings on 
how to use the drugs which are to be included in the package. For example, it is prescribed that the medical 
descriptions are in the language(s) of the country where the drugs are used. Obviously it would be 
beneficial to a multinational like MSD that distributes its drugs all over the world, if it could promote some 
harmonization of government legislation in this respect. Such harmonization could also be beneficial to 
public health when the harmonized standards would imply the use of best practices with respect to 
information on drugs contained in the package.  
 
Another example where external standards can bring about a reduction of transaction costs would be a 
standardization of qualifications of employees. When diplomas in, for example, India, China and East-
European nations would provide the same and reliable information on the different levels of skills of their 
incumbent workers, it would reduce transaction costs for firms that are outsourcing parts of their 
production processes to these countries and regions. 
 
 
3. The transaction costs economics of standards 
 
The previous sections already mention how standards can contribute to the reduction of 
transaction costs (see Williamson, 1998; North, 1990, 1994). It holds both for specialization 
and coordination of tasks within firms and for transactions at the market. The more production 
processes are specialized and split up in various parts, the more coordination is needed and the 
more important it becomes to reduce transaction costs. On the other hand, a reduction in 
transaction costs, for example by making better use of standards, will promote a further 
fragmentation of the production process. It implies more transactions, cheaper production, and 
eventually increased consumption and welfare. An important reason why standards reduce 
transaction costs is that standards tend to reduce insecurity and information problems.  In the 
literature, the best known effects of standards are network externalities and a reduction of 
switching costs (Blind, 2004). Standardization also increases the exportability of products, 
which facilitates the creation of economies of scale. 
 
Typology of transaction costs 
Transaction costs are all costs made in trade transactions, either as an exchange of property 
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rights in a market transaction, or as an exchange of responsibilities in a hierarchical situation.  
An entrepreneur who is able to keep his transaction costs low, will be more successful to offer 
an attractive product to the market, as this type of costs plays a considerable role in 
international trade. In principle two types of transaction costs can be distinguished:  the “hard” 
or direct transaction costs and the “soft” or indirect transaction costs. The hard transaction 
costs relate to costs that are readily perceptible and quantifiable, such as transport charges, 
import levies and customs authorities tariffs. The soft transaction costs are much more 
difficult to observe and measure. One can think of all kinds of costs of making and checking 
contracts, information costs, costs because of cultural differences and communication failures, 
tacit knowledge on legal procedures, formation of trust and reputation, network building, costs 
associated with risks and with rules and regulation in order to reduce risks, security 
requirements etc.  
 
These transaction costs can also be regarded as frictions in (international) trade which are the 
cause that the optimal trade equilibrium from a purely neoclassical perspective is not reached 
in practice. In fact there is much less trade than in a frictionless economy (Trefler, 1995, 
p.1029). Obviously standardization in international trade, and trade innovations like the 
container, contributed to the increase of trade flows. To what extent is unfortunately difficult 
to quantify. The theory of these frictions is comparable to the description of search frictions in 
labour economics, which give rise to dynamic unemployment equilibria (see e.g. Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1994). In a similar way as a match at the labour market transaction costs can 
materialize before, during and after the transaction itself:  the contact phase, the contract 
phase and the control phase. 
 
In the contact phase of a potential transaction, the buyer is looking for information about his 
preferred product (price and quality), potential suppliers, or, when the product does not yet 
exist, which producer could invent and/or produce it for him. The seller is trying to find a 
buyer for his product through marketing activities. Here transaction costs are mainly search 
and information costs, where transaction costs are caused by the inaccessibility or 
incompleteness of information (see also WRR, 2003). Here there is an obvious analogy with 
search costs in labour economics. A special feature of these transaction costs in the contact 
phase is that they are sunk costs and are made even when no transaction results from seeking 
contact.  
 
The contract phase starts directly after the moment the potential trading partners have found 
each other and are inclined to make a deal. Here transaction costs are made in negotiating the 
terms of the contract. Parties have to decide on how to make a reasonable slit-up of the 
expected rents of the transaction and what to write down in the contract. As there will always 
be uncertainties about expected rents it is impossible to make complete contracts that cover all 
possible circumstances. Apart from this incompleteness of information, information can be 
difficult to verify and may be asymmetrical. This means that one contracting partner can 
observe if the contract has been fulfilled, while the other contracting partner lacks this ability  
 
The phase of control consists of the monitoring and enforcement of the contract. Both involve 
high transaction costs, especially at large distances. Monitoring means that business partners 
check whether the other party is doing what he promised to do. If the check turns out that this 
is not the case, the next step is enforcement of the contract. The most common solution for 
enforcement is to start a legal procedure. Especially in international trading relationships, this 
is often a troublesome affair. It takes time and money in large quantities and foreigners often 
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feel being mistreated by prejudiced national courts when they file a claim against a national 
company.  
 
Standards and market failure 
A telephone would not have any value for a consumer as a means of communication if he or 
she would be the only user of a telephone. The higher the market penetration of telephones, 
the higher is the value of the telephone for the consumers that own a telephone. This is the 
essence of network externalities. The value of the product is closely related to the size of the 
network. A standard can contribute to the development of a network that is large enough 
(Gandal and Shy, 2001, p. 363). Network externalities that arise when the size of the network 
grows are direct network externalities. Indirect network externalities arise when the number of 
complementary products that is available increases. An example of an indirect network 
externality is the combination of computers and software. As more software becomes 
available, the value of the computer for the user increases. This is best illustrated by the 
moment that the first operating system became available for the PC: it was especially after 
that time that the PC became a success. When standardized operating systems were 
unavailable, only highly skilled professionals could use computers. Both internal and external 
network externalities are causes of market failure, which results in underinvestment, in case 
there is no intervention from the government to repair the market failure. In case of indirect 
network externalities, a standard can contribute to the reduction of market failure, because it 
makes different products compatible (WTO, 2005, p. 36). 
 
Apart from a coordination problem two other forms of market failure can arise as a result of 
network externalities: excess inertia and excess momentum. Excess inertia occurs at the supply 
side of the market, when the introduction of new techniques is delayed. In such circumstances 
firms are reluctant to bring their own technology in the market, since they take for granted that 
the technology of the market leader will be dominant and become standard. Excess 
momentum appears when buyers choose an inferior technique as standard. These two 
coordination problems are to be regarded as disadvantages of standardization. Another 
problem is that in the case of a private standard a monopoly position can be obtained. Here 
Microsoft's monopoly on the market for operating systems is a well known example. All 
software has to be compatible with the Windows operating system. Because Microsoft refused 
to make the source code of its operating system public, it was difficult for other producers to 
develop compatible software, so that Microsoft could gradually monopolize the entire 
software market. 
 
A further aspect in this context is incomplete information. High transaction costs bring about 
incomplete information when the transaction costs of acquiring the information that is needed 
are higher than the (expected) gains in cost reduction, or profits, that the additional 
information yields. Obvious this argumentation shows that incomplete information does not 
exclude rational behavior. Asymmetric information, which is a form of incomplete 
information, relates to a situation where the buyer cannot observe the quality or specific 
characteristics of products. In his famous article on signaling problems with asymmetric 
information, Akerlof (1970) gives the example of the second hand car salesman. The buyer 
does not know the quality of car, so that, as a consequence, the bad cars (to speak in Akerlof's 
terms, the “lemons”) are crowding the good cars (“peaces”) out of the market. In this case, 
asymmetrical information reduces the supply of good quality products. 
  
Mandatory standards can result in the removal from the market of all products that do not 
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comply with the minimum standard. This results (if the standard is set high enough) in 
sufficient quality of supplied goods. Voluntary standards in combination with labeling can 
provide buyers with sufficient information on quality differences in a situation where both low 
and high quality products are supplied. Negative labels can be made mandatory by the 
government for producers of goods that do not comply with a standard. Positive labeling is 
used by firms to enable the consumer to distinguish (often more expensive) products that 
comply with high standards. Therefore, standards can reduce, or even take away, the problem 
of asymmetric information identified by Akerlof. By making information more symmetric and 
less incomplete, standards reduce the transaction costs as they enable more and better 
transactions. 
 
From the perspective of information, the economic analysis distinguishes three product types: 
(i) symmetric information products; (ii) experience products; and (iii) asymmetric information 
products. Symmetric products contain the information that is needed in advance in a way that 
is observable by the customer. In the case of experience products, the characteristics can be 
observed when using it. Asymmetric information products do not give the possibility to 
observe all relevant characteristics, not even after years of usage. Standards designed to solve 
the problem of incomplete information should focus on experience products and asymmetric 
information products. The above examples of labeling show that a standard enables the 
consumer to access information that he could not have obtained otherwise. Safety 
characteristics are an example of such information. 
 
Standards as transaction costs reducing device 
Standardization decreases search and information costs, that are both part of the transaction 
costs. When product specifications are standardized and know to trading partners, the 
bargaining process will cover only the price and conditions of delivery. When the product has 
not been standardized, bargaining will also be needed with respect to the specifications of the 
product. This leaves room for additional information costs, since the buyer does not avail of 
all information needed. An example is the technical specification of parts for the automotive 
industry referred to previously. After standards were introduced, it was no longer necessary to 
search for a supplier that could produce the parts that were needed in a specific situation. 
Search costs decreased and using external suppliers became more profitable. Apart from 
search costs, contracting costs were also reduced. Contracts between the producer and its 
suppliers did no longer have to be specified extensively. Clearly this also reduced enforcement 
costs. In the early automotive industry, individual producers did not have much market power, 
so that the benefits of standardization were entirely passed on to the consumer. Box 4 
discusses two other practical examples. 
 
Box 4: How standards can reduce transaction costs in practice 
 
In the case of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) there are many types of transaction 
costs that are reduced. Administration will become less complex with XBRL. Companies using the standard 
can also reduce costs, since their internal control and reporting has become less complicated. Control by tax 
authorities will also be less time consuming, and thus less costly. The translation of the financial data from 
the backoffice system to a tax statement, warranted by the tax office, is no longer a complex process as it 
can be fully codified. For firms, it becomes much easier to serve different stakeholders with the information 
that they need, enabled by the right taxonomy and a simple push on the button. All sorts of reporting can 
take place more efficient, both in terms of time and money. Additionally, daughter firms and branches can 
be managed more efficient, since it is no longer needed to use complex internal reporting systems. 
These costs reductions from the use of XBRL are in part a consequence of economies of scale and also of 
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network externalities. For instance, it brings about considerable cost reductions for firms when external 
actors develop their own taxonomies that can be implemented in all systems of the firms where these 
external actors need information from. Reliability can also increase, since information has to be imported in 
the system only once. Obviously, this development is going to reduce accountant costs. Management can 
also obtain more tailor-made strategic information, thus improving the quality of the decision making 
process. This results once again in a reduction of transaction costs, partially because the firm can make a 
better risk assessment. 
 
At MSD an internal standard has been developed, to reduce packing costs, by – for example – using one 
package for a group of regions. Standardized packages can also improve the visibility of the firm and 
through this marketing device enhance reputation and reduce transaction costs. In other words, it reduces 
the information costs. The firm itself will mainly benefit from the standardization by lower labor costs and 
a more efficient inventory management. That is why the Dutch plant of MSD, in spite of relatively high 
labor costs in the Netherlands, has succeeded to remain efficient in the world wide distribution of drugs. In 
order to keep this position, R&D investments are needed to optimize standards that comply with the 
existing framework of legislation and regulation (which is very demanding in this specific case of drug 
packages). Because of this increased importance of R&D financing, a shift from variable costs towards 
sunk costs is taking place. Since MSD is critically assessing its own internal standards, it will also try to 
realize optimal external standards when interacting with governments. In this case of drugs packages, it 
appeared that governments were open to discussion for improvement and harmonization of standards. That 
is because also for governments, common arrangements in the form of standardized rules and regulations of 
what drug packages should contain, can be efficient. It ensures that the registration of drugs in one country 
will be transmissible to other countries and also that the rules and regulations are upgraded to best practices. 
Other producers can also benefit from these standardization efforts. That is way it is relevant to have these 
externalities of these standardization processes internalized in club goods or through governments.  
 
Standards and trust 
Trust is an important mechanism that enables the reduction of transaction costs, especially in 
the frequent cases of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. In such cases, contracts can 
never be complete, and trust will always play a role somewhere in the transaction process 
(Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; Mosch, 2004). Standards may very much contribute to such 
formation of trust. The example of Rembrandt’s syndics shows that quality standards for 
“laken” will only lead to lower transaction costs when all stakeholders trust the expertise and 
independence of the controlling authority. A painting, made by a well known painter, that 
shows the distinguished gentlemen, can help to establish trust. This example illustrates the 
close relation between standards and trust. The reputation and reliability of the quality labels 
have to be build up slowly, because the formation of a trustworthy reputation will need some 
time. Explaining the standard and what it stands for to its users on the one hand, as well as 
adequate supervision, and careful development of a reputation of trust and reliability on the 
other hand, are needed to make the label to a success. Here the saying is that trust comes by 
foot, but may ride away on horse back. There is an analogy with the fiduciary character of 
money. When everybody can be sure that his or her coins and notes are universally accepted 
as means of payment, and when it is almost impossible to bring false money into circulation, 
money transactions can take place at low information costs. It is for that reason that central 
banks put great efforts in reducing opportunities to falsify money. Bank notes are printed on 
special paper and use high tech printing techniques with hidden features and holograms, in 
order to fight counterfeit (see e.g. Williams and Anderson, 2007). The Dutch central bank has 
also used marketing campaigns to show the public how they can detect false banknotes, 
thereby making the job very difficult for falsifiers. Similar methods are needed to make 
traders and consumers familiar with all kinds of (other) standards. The familiarity increases 
trust. In that way, brand names play also a role as standards, and can represent a high value for 
firms. For that reason familiar and established brand names were used to enhance trust in 
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internet trade. 
 
4. Investing in standardization 
 
This section deals with incentives for the development of standards. It is from the way 
standards affect the economy that can be derived why standards are used and developed. Even 
though standards are often developed in reaction to market incentives, as has been already 
argued above, market failures are present in other cases. This will result in too many or too 
little (or no) standards. The next section discusses more extensively how market failure can be 
an argument to legitimize government intervention. 
 
Incentives to standardize: standardization and the market 
Standards play an important role in the ever increasing fragmentation of production, and the 
related process of globalization. Here the chain of causality goes in two directions. On the one 
hand the reduction of transaction costs through standardization creates possibilities for an 
increased division of labor and more specialization. On the other hand more specialization 
and the reduction of other types of transaction costs that globalization brings about, e.g. 
through economies of scale and better exploitation of comparative advantages in factor 
endowments, will enhance the need for world wide standards. These cost reductions 
associated with fragmentation of production (outsourcing) and standardization will usually 
not only benefit producers, but by lowering product prices, will eventually also benefit the 
consumer. How welfare gains of standardization are shared between producers and consumers 
depends largely on the extent that producers are able to exclude others from using the 
standard. If, under the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition, excluding competitors 
is impossible, every gain in productivity will eventually be passed on to the consumer. 
 
Box 5: Standards and the chip market 
 
The chip market provides an interesting example of how standards affect the profit sharing between 
different players in markets. Intel plays an important role in setting standards in the chip market. These 
standards to a large extent exclude other producers from using that standard, especially since other 
producers (in the chip market this is especially AMD, which stands for Advanced Micro Devices) always 
have a technological lag relative to Intel, and can only start developing their own product after enough 
information about the newest generation Intel chips has become available. On the market for other 
computer parts there is much more competition. It is important for Intel that its chips have excellent 
compatibility with these parts, which means that Intel has to provide producers with information in an early 
stage of development, thus enabling the newest generation of processors to be compatible with available 
motherboards. Other chip producers can, based on this information, only reconstruct what the design of the 
newest processor looks like (reverse engineering), while it is relatively easy for producers of motherboards 
to make a design that has good compatibility with the Intel processors. This enables Intel (which almost has 
a monopoly) to keep its profits high, while the producers of other parts (that are faced with almost perfect 
competition) have no or compared with Intel only very small profits. 
 
The presence of standards results in more competition, because inter-compatibility of 
intermediate products and parts reduces switching costs (being part of total transaction costs). 
Joining such a standard reduces the dependence on specific suppliers (or on dominant 
customers). This increased competition will, generally and on the long run, benefit the 
consumer. However, if other producers cannot use the standard, the owner will have the 
possibility to acquire a monopoly position (see box 5). 
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In some markets network externalities (see the previous section) play an important role. 
Standards can be warranted in such markets, but there are also pitfalls from the perspective of 
the functioning of these markets. For example, the GSM telephones in Europe – where only 
one standards was used- became an almost instant success, while it never reached the same 
level of market penetration in the United States (WTO, 2005). It illustrates that under specific 
circumstances (in Europe) different producers have a strong incentive to cooperate. At the 
same time, the case of the US makes clear that this cooperation does not always take place. It 
can be that network externalities result in different players (both producers and consumers) 
waiting until the market has chosen for a standard. Especially in the ICT sector this inter-
compatibility is of great importance. When a standard has reached a certain critical mass, it is 
very likely to become (almost) the standard and will crowd out other possible standards. 
  
An important incentive for firms to develop a standard can be the so called first-mover 
advantages. The designer of the standard has a time advantage on his competitors when 
entering the market, which will usually give him the opportunity to maintain a large market 
share on the longer term. He also has a knowledge advantage. The presence of network 
externalities is usually amplified by the non rival nature of standards. Every additional user is 
increasing the utility of all other users, while this does not come at the cost of all other users 
having to share the good with the new user. 
 
Economies of scale and network externalities make a preference for international standards 
over local standards plausible. Obviously global standards give the opportunity to realize even 
more economies of scale, now that there is not only the advantage of national compatibility 
but also that of international compatibility. This is becoming increasingly important in the 
globalizing world of today. 
 
The possibility to obtain the exclusive right to use a standard – by using patents and 
copyrights – is also an incentive to develop standards. When the standard is protected by 
copyrights or patents, it gives the owners the possibility to financially exploit their invention, 
and to exercise market power. The next section further discuses this relation between patents 
and standards. The possibility to exclude others from using the standard decreases the 
opportunities for free riders. Especially in a situation of network externalities, the possibility 
to exclude others plays an important role. Here, producers and users have a strong economic 
incentive to use one and the same standard, as soon as it has become the dominant standard in 
the market. Therefore, the monetary value of this standard will be very large for its owner. 
This is the problem of “the winner takes it all”. 
 
When free rider behavior becomes possible, and first mover advantages become smaller, 
producers will take a more passive approach in the development and implementation of a new 
standard. In that case, it pays to wait until another producer has introduced a standard, and 
adopts that standard. The producer that developed the standard will bear all the development 
costs, while the benefits of the standard are the same for all players on the market. This will 
result in a clear competitive disadvantage for the innovating firm. In situations like this, it can 
take a considerably time before a standard is introduced in the market. 
 
Section 3 discussed that so called asymmetric information products have characteristics that 
cannot even be observed after the products have been used. Large players in a market (with 
well known brands) can communicate these characteristics by building a good reputation, yet 
small players often lack this possibility. In such a situation the producers of products with a 
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relatively high quality have a strong incentive to join a quality standard. Whether it pays off to 
introduce a new standard depends on the extent to which existing standards are present and on 
the costs that are needed to introduce such a standard (for example marketing costs to get the 
general public familiarized with the standard). It is striking that in most industries there is 
only one quality standard. Producers that meet the minimum requirements of this standard 
would often also meet the requirements of a higher quality standard. There are several reasons 
why in such cases it is not profitable for these producers to come with their own standard. 
First, the costs of the new standard would have to be shared between a smaller number of 
firms. Second, the consumer can only respond to a limited amount of information, which 
means that every additional standard necessitates even larger marketing costs, and will also 
increase the information costs for the consumer. 
 
These arguments illustrate again that the possibility to exclude others from using a standard 
plays an essential role. A quality standard makes little sense when products of inferior quality 
cannot be excluded from making use of the standard (for instance when producers pretend 
that they comply with the quality standard in their marketing campaigns). 
 
How are standards set? 
Sometimes, an existing technology somewhat fortuitously becomes a standard. In cases like 
this, the standard has an ad-hoc character. The standard is just there, without the pretension or 
plan to make it a standard. Standards which are developed as club goods may rather soon 
become profitable, since the costs can be shared while the club can still exercise some market 
power. In many other cases, however, a lot of coordination is needed to come to a standard. 
This is especially true for public standards, as in such cases it less likely that the benefits of 
developing the standard are large enough for only one or a few producers who are to develop 
and implement the standard. Yet, from the perspective of social welfare the development of 
such public standard could be warranted when the welfare gains of all stakeholders would 
exceed the costs of the development of the standard. In such a case there is a role for the 
government. 
 
Standardization agencies, like the German DIN or CELENEC in Europe, constitute another 
important institutional arrangement through which standards can be developed. In the 
Netherlands the ECP.NL platform plays such a role with regard to ICT. A large number of 
standards, with a more or less official character have been developed this way. The 
development of standards by standardization agencies often takes place via a trajectory of 
consultation of and discussion with different stakeholders. That is because consensus 
formation and creating support for the use of the standard is essential. In order to get patents 
and copyrights recognized as a standard, standardizing organizations usually demand that they 
can be used at no cost or at relative low costs. This is relevant in case these standards were 
originally excludable as a private good or club good. In case of complete exclusion, there will 
be potential users that do not use the standard (for example when the price set by the owner is 
to high, or access to the standard has been denied to them completely), while the marginal 
revenues of using the standard would still be larger then the marginal costs for them. This is 
inefficient from a welfare point of view. When the designer of the standard has the possibility 
to ask a certain price from users of the standard (in order to stimulate the development of new 
standards), a trade-off occurs. A choice has to be made between efficient usage of existing 
standards on the one hand, and speeding up the development of new and improved standards 
on the other hand. Here, an open standard (see section 2), that can be used by everyone freely, 
is the best solution. Sometimes, when the owner can exclude others from using the standard, it 
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can turn into a “the winner takes it all” situation. The mentioned dominant positions of 
Microsoft and Intel in the computer world are good examples of that. On the other hand, 
standardizing agencies have an incentive to produce as many standards as possible, which 
could result in over standardization. Further research should reveal whether this is the case. 
  
Farell (1996) modeled the process of political negotiation that takes place when standardizing 
organizations adopt a new standard. He considers a situation where several producers want to 
have a high quality standard implemented. When these stakeholders have large vested 
interests, it can be very profitable for them to get their own standard adopted, even if there is a 
better standard available (note that the concept of competitive advantages does not take 
efficiency gains that are equal for all companies into account). The willingness to wait plays 
an important role here. Since a high degree of consensus is needed to get the standard 
implemented, a stakeholder that can wait for a long time (and therefore has a strong 
bargaining position) has a strong incentive not to agree with a proposed standard that is of 
high quality but very different from its own standard. This stakeholder hopes that a fast 
implementation of a standard will be of such importance for the other stakeholders that they 
will eventually agree with an inferior standard. An interesting conclusion of Farell is, 
however, that the player with the best standard will usually have the largest preparedness to 
wait. Therefore he argues that the negotiation process is mainly a process of screening, where 
the different stakeholders rank each others preparedness to wait. This eventually results in an 
ex ante standard of high quality, but can be very time consuming. ICT improvements have 
somewhat increased the speed at which new standards are adopted by standardizing agencies, 
but it did have almost no effect on the screening process where the players explore each 
others preparedness to wait. The time that is needed get a new standard implemented is still 
over three years (IEC). This is an improvement compared with the situation 10 years ago, 
when, according to the annual report of 1995, more than 5 years where needed. Yet the 
process is still very slow. Especially when existing interests are large (usually when there are 
multiple stakeholders with large market shares), it can be efficient to increase the speed of the 
process, even if this comes at the cost of adoption of a suboptimal standard (Farell, 1996).  
 
When setting a standard, the interests of the end users (often consumers) usually obtain less 
attention than those of the producers. The interests of individual producers are often very 
large, so that even for one producer it can be profitable to contribute actively to the 
development of a standard. Additionally, the number of producers is often somewhat limited, 
which makes it easy to get a standard introduced in a coordinated action. The users of the 
standard are often a large mass where the individual interests related to the standard are only 
very small. However, when their number is sufficiently large enough (as is often the case) 
their combined interest can easily be larger than that of the producers. 
 
The welfare economics of standards 
By reducing transaction costs standards generally have a positive effect on the economy and 
enhance social welfare. This is especially true when standards are voluntary and can be used 
(almost) freely by all market players. An example is the open source standards that are often 
developed by the users themselves (a well known example is the operating system Linux). An 
intriguing question from the economic perspective is about the incentives for the contributors 
to these freely available open sources (Lerner and Tirole, 2000, 2004; Von Krogh and Von 
Hippel, 2003; Gutsche, 2005; Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006). These open standards seem to 
give much opportunity for free riders, and there are no direct revenues for the contributors to 
the standard. However, it appears that informal hierarchies between the contributors build up, 
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where only a limited number of key programmers obtain the power to decide which additions 
are included in the system. Joining such a group of experts may increase the prospect to find a 
(well) payed job related to the open standard. Apart from that, intrinsic motivation often plays 
an important role for the contributors to open source standards. 
 
Standards may also have a negative effect on the economy and be welfare diminishing. This is 
especially the case when they are used worldwide and there is a large existing infrastructure 
with high sunk costs. In such cases, the existing standard can make further innovation almost 
impossible. This has to do with the high transition costs (that are also part of transaction costs) 
of switching to a new and better standard. A well known example is the QWERTY keyboard, 
introduced in the late 19th century to prevent typing machines from jamming. In this era of 
computers it would be possible to switch to a keyboard design that maximizes typing speed. 
However, the costs of such a change are very high, since everyone would have to learn typing 
all over again. 
 
Large network externalities can be a major cause of these “lock-in” effects. Here, the costs of 
being the first one to switch to a new standard, which is not compatible with the old one, can 
be extremely high. This will block innovation until the revenues of the new standard have 
become very high. A good example are fuel engines. The whole infrastructure, with roads, 
automotive industry, gas stations and everyone that has learned how to drive such a car, 
makes it almost impossible to abandon this standard in favor of another. The economics of 
these kinds of technological transitions have been extensively studied, especially with respect 
to new standards and technologies that are more efficient in energy use and therefore enhance 
environmental quality (see for example Den Butter and Hofkes, 2006). 
 
Obviously there is a relation between standards and innovations: several studies found a 
positive relationship (WRR, 2003). A study of the DIN (2000) of the effects of standards on 
the German economy concludes that the impact of standards on the growth of the economy 
exceeds that of other types of innovation. However, standards can also be harmful to 
innovation so that the relationship becomes negative. Standardization can for example 
decrease the speed at which other major innovations are being developed. Innovations that 
require a standard which is not (yet) used world wide with sufficient network externalities, 
will be costly to develop as the revenues from the innovations will be low, at least on the short 
run. Also, the “winner takes it all” effects tend to increase the risks of innovators. The chance 
that in the end the technology of another developer becomes the standard is large in such 
cases. If so, there will be no revenues at all but only the sunk development costs. As a higher 
rate of return is demanded from investment opportunities with the same expected return but a 
higher risk, this risk premium implies a lower net present value of investments in new 
technologies. External effects may, however, sometimes result in additional revenues, that can 
be collected by the owner of the standard. This might also result in higher revenues of 
products that are compatible with the standard. Blind (2004) finds that industries with a high 
R&D intensity are characterized by a relatively low number of existing standards. It therefore 
seems that causality exists in two directions here: innovating industries do not standardize as 
much as other industries, and strongly standardized industries innovate less. Some other 
studies find, however, that there is not necessarily a causal relation between standardization 
and R&D expenditures (Blind, 2004).  
 
The increased risks when the innovations are dependent on standards, appear to be an 
important reason for firms to join collective standardization projects. In this way, the risks of 
 18 
R&D projects can be substantially reduced (DIN, 2000). Additionally, empirical evidence 
shows that other forces than standards are of far more importance as barriers for innovation 
(DIN, 2000). Moreover, as soon as innovations have become implemented as standards, these 
new technologies find their way to the production process and to the end users at a much 
higher speed than when standards play no role in the innovations. This may (more than) 
compensate the risk premium and consequent decrease in investments in innovations. 
Especially standardizing agencies play an important role in this respect. When new 
technologies are well specified in a standard, and for all stakeholders available at no or low 
costs, the diffusion of the new technology will accelerate (WTO, 2005; Blind, 2004). All in 
all, standardization seems to bring about a reduction in investments in new technologies, but 
at the same time in a better usage and broader application of the new technologies. Since this 
last effect is of far more importance than the first, the relation with innovation is (strongly) 
positive after all. 
 
5. Standards and the government 
 
The previous argumentation shows that leaving the development of standards entirely to the 
market can sometimes result in solutions that are suboptimal from the perspective of social 
welfare. The existence of market failure is a necessary – though certainly not sufficient – 
condition for government intervention. This section contains a more extensive review of the 
various aspects of market failure and of the role that the government can play in that case. 
First, asymmetric information and network externalities as sources of market failure are 
discussed. Subsequently, this section considers the role of the government in making the use 
of standards excludable, by protecting intellectual property rights. 
 
Asymmetric information 
In some cases, asymmetric information, where the producer usually has better access to 
information then his buyers, can result in inefficiencies. This is a clear case of market failure, 
since the assumption of full information is no longer met. When asymmetric information 
results in the inability of consumers to include some relevant aspects of the product in their 
buying decision, it is possible that only products that score low on these aspects are offered on 
the market, since they cost less (WTO, 2005). This can be undesirable, and therefore, albeit 
under conditions, can be a legitimatized ground for government intervention. 
 
The government can take several measures to repair these market failures. One possibility is 
to force the producers to label their products. Another possibility to intervene is a complete 
ban on products that do not comply with a certain minimum level of quality. The latter is often 
inefficient, since there may also be demand for lower quality products. For instance, some 
consumers might not derive any utility from the fact that a good has been produced in an 
ecologically responsible manner. 
 
Apart from internalizing negative externalities, it is especially through reducing information 
problems that the government can benefit society. It can be done by the introduction of a 
quality label that provides the user with information on several relevant aspects. Such a 
multidimensional quality label facilitates the supply of products with various quality levels. 
This system aims at promoting product differentiation which enhances consumer welfare. 
Although such a standard does no longer imply a unified set of minimum requirements that all 
products should comply with, it can still be regarded a standard. Joining this type of standard 
can be voluntary or mandatory. It is very likely that producers that have a low score on certain 
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dimensions will not voluntarily join the standard, in the hope that consumers will expect an 
average quality of the product in the absence of information. This can be undesirable. 
Therefore, the EU-energy label, for example, is mandatory and must be used by all producers. 
 
Definitions with a subjective character pose another type of asymmetric information problem. 
For example, the definition of chocolate has been specified in a standard that prescribes, 
amongst other things, a minimum percentage of cacao. Producers are not allowed to label 
products that do not comply with the standard definition of chocolate as “chocolate”. Such 
(mandatory) standards are desirable from a social welfare point of view, since they reduce the 
opportunities to misuse asymmetric information. In this way they reduce the chances of 
miscommunication and as a consequence the information costs for consumers. It is, however, 
important that the standard is closely related to popular definitions of the products that are 
covered by them. In other words, it is important that what is defined as “chocolate” in the 
minimum standard, is in line with what is generally considered to be chocolate. 
 
Exclusivity and the protection of intellectual property rights 
When third parties cannot be excluded from using a new (improved) standard, it will less 
often become profitable to invest in the development of such a standard. On the other hand, a 
standard protected by copyrights or patents, provides the owners with the possibility to 
exercise market power. It raises the price of using the innovative standards and consequently 
yields an incentive to increase the supply of innovative standards, while their usage will at the 
same time decrease. Obviously there is a trade off in this situation. Farell (1995) shows that in 
the presence of network externalities a less than full protection is justified from the 
perspective of social welfare. Two types of inefficiencies accumulate here: (i) the individual 
that does not use the standard whereas his or her gain in utility of using the standard is higher 
than the marginal costs, and (ii) the decrease in the utility of the other users, caused by the 
non-participation of this additional user. Empirical evidence shows that the presence of 
patents is indeed an important motivation to standardize (Blind, 2004). 
  
When several producers engage in the development of a new standard at the same time, as 
was the case with the development of the DVD-player and the VCR, in the end all producers 
will have to switch to the technology that succeeds in reaching a critical mass of users first. In 
such situations the contribution of individual producers does not really lie in the development 
of the standard as it is, but rather in developing it a little bit faster or better than the others. 
Here, the first producer who gets his or her finding patented is rewarded with all the revenues. 
Again: “the winner takes it all”. The presence of strong network externalities makes it even 
possible that a standard that has been chosen somewhat arbitrarily (e.g. it is not outstanding 
with respect to quality compared with the other technologies that competed to become the 
standard), becomes protected by copyrights or patents anyway. Therefore, most standardizing 
agencies require that the standard that is adopted is available free or at a reasonable price. 
 
Legislation by competition authorities, which prevents cartel formation, may exclude 
inventions that have become a standard, from the protection by property rights. This can 
happen in cases where this protection results in decreased market competition. Measures that 
have lately been taken against Microsoft are a well known example. At first sight it seems 
somewhat unfair, because it implies that findings that are “somewhat” useful are protected, 
while a finding that becomes “very” useful at a certain point in time, loses this protection. 
However, it is plausible that making such exceptions will benefit social welfare. Moreover, 
since the large profitability of these findings stems mainly from the fact that they have 
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become a standard, and not so much because of the exceptional quality of the innovation 
itself, it can be regarded as unjust that the owner of the standard obtains a monopoly. Blind 
(2004) points at the fact that a lot of useful standards have started as patented technologies – 
something that is clearly positive – while these same patents can (especially when the 
standard has become a success) substantially reduce technological progress afterwards since 
others are not allowed to develop it further, and since diffusion of the standard is limited. In 
that case “standing on shoulders”, which is a major source of technological progress, is no 
longer possible. 
 
Apart from the arguments above with respect to the externalities of standardization, the 
government can also standardize its own services. A special case relates to services provided 
to multinational organizations. These organizations often have to take all sorts of differences 
in rules and legislation that exist between different countries into account. It can bring about 
high transaction costs for them. Especially small countries with legislation that differs 
substantially from that of other nations, will make themselves less interesting for 
multinationals. For a small country like the Netherlands it is therefore important to take this 
aspect of international compatibility into account when reconsidering the design of the legal 
system. Harmonization and less complexity can enhance the ability of a nation to attract 
foreign investments. To keep such country attractive as a trade nation, it is important to be one 
of the first in designing and adopting new international standards, especially with respect to 
government services. An example is harmonization and reducing transaction costs with 
respect to customs regulation, where many changes already have been made through the 
WCO (World Customs Organization). 
 
Finally, ineffective governance with respect to standardization can result in an increased 
negative effect of the lock-in effects discussed earlier. When the government very strongly 
supports a certain standard, and when it can be changed only through lengthy procedures, the 
introduction of a new and better standard will be much more difficult. This is once again a 
plea for a well designed standardization policy, that is preferably organized through 
standardizing agencies. These agencies can devote special attention to policies that attempt to 
reduce lock-in effects, by promoting and supporting the introduction and development of new 
and better standards. The government can subsequently play a helpful role as an early adopter. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper outlines what can be called: “the economics of standardization”. By giving a 
number of examples, it describes the mechanisms through which standards have their impact 
on the economy. A major aspect is that standards are important means to reduce transaction 
costs. They may reduce uncertainties, risks and other information problems; they may exploit 
economies of scale and network externalities, and they may enhance coordination of 
production processes. Thanks to standards more transactions can take place, which is 
beneficial to social welfare.. It is striking that welfare economics has somewhat neglected this 
important role of standards in the literature. 
 
There is a large diversity of standards, differing from standards that are used within a certain 
firm to standards that are used at a global level and have resulted in fundamental changes in 
transaction and trade technologies and infrastructure. The container is a good example of the 
latter. It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between what can be called a standard, 
legislation, institutionalization or technology. One could even say that a common language, or 
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a common value system within a society can also be considered as standards. At least, similar 
processes that reduce transaction costs play a role here. For example, empirical evidence 
shows that countries with similar legislation have relatively large bilateral trade flows (Den 
Butter and Mosch, 2002). From that perspective the International Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) attempts to harmonize tax legislation of different countries throughout 
the world. Empirical research of Islam and Reshef (2006) shows that good and reliable 
institutions are even more important for international trade than harmonization of these 
institutions. Therefore, standards should also play an important role in controlling the quality 
and reliability of institutions. 
 
There is also a definition problem with respect to what can be called a standard and what an 
innovation. Many of the examples of this paper show that standards can often be considered 
innovations themselves – again the container as an obvious example. Often, it is not so much 
the technological sophistication – it is a mistake to focus innovation policy exclusively on 
“high tech” – but organizational efforts that are in particular needed to get a new 
technological standard implemented and accepted by different stakeholders. The relation 
between innovations and standards has yet another dimension. On the one hand, the existence 
of a standard can result in a large number of other additional innovations within the system of 
the standard, that derive their value from the standard. On the other hand, because of high 
sunk costs, a standard can result in a lock-in situation, where innovations that do not comply 
with the dominant standard, no longer take place. This problem of the lock-in, and that of high 
transition costs of escaping from it, also occurs when a much better alternative for the old 
standards becomes available, that would improve social welfare on the long term. In that 
sense, standards can also harm welfare. 
 
The extent to which the standard has the character of a public good appears essential for the 
way standards affect the economy. Often, a technology or specification becomes a standard 
after a dominant market player in the private sector has put efforts in getting it accepted 
within the market. In order to guard against free riders, and to earn back the investment and 
implementation costs of the standard, it should be made possible to exclude others from using 
the standard. However, exclusion of others from using the standard becomes undesirable from 
the perspective of social welfare, when the use of a standard brings about network 
externalities. In cases of market failure, incentives to invest in the development of standards 
can be too low. In such cases government intervention is needed. A similar argument holds for 
government support to escape from lock-in effects and to come to faster implementation of 
newer and better standards. It is difficult however, to organize this government intervention in 
an effective and efficient way. 
 
This paper only provides a qualitative review of the way standards reduce transaction costs, 
and of the consequent welfare gains. Quantification of these welfare gains, but also of the 
costs of the introduction and implementation of standards, has barely taken place. This is a 
promising field for further research. 
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Picture 1. The “syndics” by Rembrandt, setting standards for the quality of “laken”. 
 
 
 
Picture 2. Hugo de Groot (Grotius), protagonist of internationally accepted sea law. 
 
